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Abstract  
The single supervisory mechanism and the single 
resolution mechanism are the two main pillars of the European 
banking union. These complex frameworks encompass innovative 
quasi-judicial systems which allow undertakings and national 
authorities to contend certain decisions taken respectively by the 
ECB and the SRB, through two technical independent bodies, 
namely an Administrative Board of Review (ABoR) and an Appeal 
Panel. Through a comparison of the founding provisions of these 
two panels with other similar experiences in highly regulated 
technical sectors, it is argued that the current architecture of non-
judicial remedies available in the banking union is not set up as a 
single unitary model, but as an hybrid one with distinctive 
features adapted to the peculiarities of supervisory and recovery 
functions. It is questionable whether such characteristic may 
impair the position of private individuals and the ability to cope 
with the complex matters concerned in an effective way.  
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1. Introduction 
The single supervisory mechanism (SSM)1 and the single 
                                                     
*Bank of Italy, Consumer Protection and Anti-Money Laundering Directorate. 
The opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations expressed in the paper 
are those of the authors only and do not involve the responsibility of the Bank 
of Italy. 
1 For a preliminary analysis of the SSM, see S. Antoniazzi, L’Unione bancaria 
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resolution mechanism (SRM) are the two main pillars of the 
European banking union. These complex frameworks ideally 
continue the political and legal track prompted in the EU by the 
global financial crisis, which eventually resulted in the creation of 
the three European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the 
extension of powers of the European Central Bank (ECB)2. Despite 
being founded on different legal bases and decisional paths, the 
SSM and the SRM intend to pursue certain common objectives: 
indeed, both aim to safeguard financial stability within the Union 
in general and the Eurozone in particular. From this main 
objective, further sub-objectives can be identified as preeminent, 
such as the enhancement of safety and soundness of credit 
institutions, the protection of investors and depositors, the 
preservation of public trust in the financial system, and the 
prevention of contagion and domino effects in the light of a 
smooth functioning of the single internal market. 
The SSM and the SRM encompass all the financial “entities” 
of the Eurozone: these will be supervised and resolved according 
to flexibly distributed functions and tasks, in an institutional 
realm in which intersections, exceptions and risks of overlapping 
between European and national institutions are as much as 
distinctive rules and precise dividing lines. The two mechanisms 
provide for the use of heterogeneous powers and instruments 
assigned to public actors which strongly differ for their respective 
tradition, responsibility and resources. 
The high degree of substantial and procedural 
sophistication of the two pillars may have overshadowed certain 
of their most interesting and innovative characteristics which 
directly touch upon the protection of individuals and the 
possibility to contend the decisions taken by the authorities: 
                                                                                                                                  
europea: i nuovi compiti della BCE di vigilanza prudenziale degli enti creditizi e il 
meccanismo unico di risoluzione delle crisi bancarie, Riv. it. dir. pubbl. comun., 
(2014) 359, and L. Donato, R. Grasso, Gli strumenti della nuova vigilanza bancaria 
europea. Oltre il testo unico bancario, verso il “single supervisory mechanism”, in 
Banca Impr. Soc., (2014) 3. For a critical approach to certain problems posed by 
the SSM under the perspective of European administrative law, see E. Chiti, Il 
meccanismo di vigilanza unico: un passo avanti e tre problemi, in Giorn. dir. amm. 
1025, (2013).  
2 See M. Mancini, Dalla vigilanza nazionale armonizzata alla Banking Union, in 
Banca d’Italia - 73, Quaderni di Ricerca Giuridica della Consulenza Legale, 
September 9 (2013). 
SCIASCIA - ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW WITHIN THE ECB 
 
372 
 
reference is made to the quasi-judicial systems of review of certain 
supervisory and recovery decisions which are respectively 
entrusted in an Administrative Board of Review (ABoR) within the 
SSM, and in an Appeal Panel within the SRM. 
This paper analyzes such internal review mechanisms, so as 
to verify whether these mirror similar tools adopted in other fields 
of European law; the aim of this exercise is to gather a preliminary 
understanding of the possible extent of intervention by such 
newly established review bodies. The contribution is structured as 
follows: the first two paragraphs describe the functioning and 
powers of the ABoR and the Appeal Panel; the third paragraph 
briefly describes the tasks and powers of other similar quasi-
judicial review bodies established in the fields of intellectual 
property, functioning of the internal market and financial 
regulation in the EU, while the last paragraph will briefly discuss 
similarities and divergences. It is argued that the appeal bodies 
established within the SSM and the SRM have not been designed 
according to a unitary model: indeed, they represent a distinctive 
framework for technical review of decisions which is adapted to 
the functions, goals and peculiarities of the systems they belong 
to. 
 
 
2. The review of supervisory decisions within the SSM 
Under the SSM, both the ECB and national supervisory 
authorities (NSAs) are entitled to adopt certain decisions towards 
regulated entities, in accordance with a set of criteria laid down in 
Regulation No. 1024/2013 (the SSM Regulation). In this respect, 
Regulation No. 468/2014 on the functioning of the SSM explicitly 
defines the «ECB supervisory decision» as a legal act adopted by 
the ECB in the exercise of the tasks and powers conferred on it by 
the SSM Regulation, which takes the form of an ECB decision, is 
addressed to one or more supervised entities or supervised groups 
or one or more other persons and is not a legal act of general 
application3. 
                                                     
3 Article 2(1), line 26), of the Regulation on the functioning of the SSM. No 
definition of «NSA’s supervisory decision» is provided, although this could be 
implicitly understood as any decision taken by the competent NSA in the 
exercise of the residual supervisory powers conferred by the SSM Regulation 
and the relevant national law, and according to the procedures laid down by 
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Any natural or legal person may request the ABoR to 
review an ECB supervisory decision adopted under Regulation 
1024/2013 which is addressed, or is of a direct and individual 
concern, to that person. In particular, the ABoR is entitled to assess 
the procedural and substantive conformity with the SSM 
Regulation of the decisions taken by the ECB, according to a 
procedure laid down in article 24 of the SSM Regulation itself. 
The ECB supervisory decisions which may be subject to 
such internal administrative review can be categorized in two 
different classes. The first category comprehends the decisions 
concerning the establishment of subsidiaries and the exercise of 
freedom of establishment by credit institutions which are 
registered in any EU Member State not participating to the 
banking union; this category also includes the decisions of the 
ECB which apply the European and national provisions on 
prudential requirements, including organizational arrangements, 
own funds and - most remarkably, for the scope of this review - 
early intervention and resolution planning. The second category 
includes the decisions which approve or do not object to draft 
supervisory decisions by NSAs submitted to the ECB: reference is 
made to the so called common procedures which are regulated 
under Part V of Regulation No. 468/2014, and which extend 
beyond the ordinary scope of supervision on significant entities. 
According to the wording of article 24(1) of the SSM 
Regulation, the ABoR is established by the ECB to carry out an 
internal administrative review of the decisions taken by the ECB 
itself in the exercise of powers conferred on it by the SSM 
Regulation. Therefore, the ABoR is intended to be an internal body 
of the ECB: it has been established in April 2014 with decision 
ECB/2014/16, which also contains certain important provisions 
on its scope of review and functioning. 
The legal framework provided equips the ABoR with an 
extent of operational powers and arrangements aimed at 
preserving its independence, and attempting to ensure a sufficient 
level of resources and expertise to assess the effective exercise of 
powers by the ECB. In particular, it is established that the 
members of the ABoR shall be individuals of high repute from 
Member States, with a proven record of relevant knowledge and 
                                                                                                                                  
the latter. 
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professional experience to a sufficiently high level in the fields of 
banking and other financial services; current staff of the ECB, of 
NSAs or any other institution involved in the carrying out of the 
tasks conferred on the ECB by the SSM Regulation, is not allowed 
to be appointed as a member of the ABoR. Furthermore, members 
of the board shall not be bound by any instructions; they are 
appointed by the ECB for a five-year term following a public call 
for expressions of interest published in the Official Journal of the 
EU. 
Article 24(1) of the SSM Regulation describes the review 
procedure before the ABoR. This is triggered by a written request 
by the natural or legal person concerned, which must be 
submitted within one month of the date of notification of the 
decision to the appellant, or, in the absence thereof, of the day on 
which it came to the knowledge of the latter. The request is 
accompanied by a statement of grounds, and it is subject to a 
preliminary ruling on its admissibility4. 
The submission of the instance for review does not suspend 
the contended decision: nevertheless, the Governing Council of 
the ECB, upon a proposal of the ABoR, has the power to order the 
suspension upon request of the appellant and after having heard 
the opinion of the Supervisory Board. Decision 2014/16 specifies 
that the suspension can be granted only when the Governing 
Council is satisfied that the request for review is admissible and 
not obviously unfounded (fumus boni iuris) and the immediate 
application of the contested decision may cause irreparable 
damage (periculum in mora). It appears that this assessment will be 
conducted by the ABoR in submitting is proposal for suspension 
to the Governing Council: nevertheless, it is interesting to note 
that the suspensory power is granted to a body which prima facie 
did not exercise its power to object as provided under article 26(8) 
of the SSM Regulation, thus acknowledging to a later contended 
decision. In the light of the short timing established to submit a 
request for review before the ABoR, the Governing Council would 
be called to reexamine the very same decision at the latest by 35-40 
days after its adoption (rectius: missed objection to such decision). 
                                                     
4 In particular, the ABoR must establish whether and to what extent the request 
for review is admissible; any evaluation must be reported in the opinion 
submitted to the supervisory board. 
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The ABoR shall adopt an opinion on the requested review 
within a time period appropriate to its urgency and, in any case, 
no later than two months from the date of receipt of the notice of 
review. Following its analysis, the ABoR drafts an opinion which 
is approved by a simple majority of its members and which is not 
binding for the decisional bodies of the ECB. In particular, the 
ABoR may propose to either abrogate the initial decision, replace 
it with a decision of identical content or with an amended one; in 
the latter case, the ABoR shall also indicate the amendments to be 
included. 
Upon receipt of the ABoR’s opinion, the Supervisory Board 
shall propose a new draft decision to the Governing Council by 10 
or 20 days, depending on whether the new draft is equivalent to 
the contended decision or it implies the abrogation or the reform 
of the latter. In submitting such new draft decision, the 
Supervisory Board may also consider elements other than the 
grounds indicated by the applicant in its notice of review, and 
which were relied upon by the ABoR in submitting its opinion. 
Finally, the new draft decision is deemed adopted unless the 
Governing Council objects within a maximum period of ten 
working days5. 
 
 
3. The review of decisions within the SRM framework 
The SRM Regulation provides for an application of the tools 
and recovery and resolution powers laid down in the BRRD to the 
                                                     
5 Article 31(5) of Regulation No. 468/2014 establishes that when an urgent 
supervisory decision is adopted, a party must be given the opportunity to 
comment in writing on the facts, objections and legal grounds relevant to such 
decision without undue delay after its adoption. These comments in writing 
must be submitted within a time limit of two weeks from receipt of the ECB 
supervisory decision. On application of the party, the ECB may extend the time 
limit, subject to the general limit of six months. The ECB will review the 
decision in the light of the party’s comments and may either confirm it, revoke 
it, amend it or revoke it and replace it with a new supervisory decision. This 
review power resembles a tertium genus in respect of the reexamination power 
of the ABoR and the right to be heard provided in the ordinary adoption of 
supervisory decisions. The decisions taken following this procedure may also 
be appealed before the ABoR, as no provision explicitly excludes them from the 
scope of review of the appeal panel. 
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peculiarities and features of the banking union6. The final version 
of the SRM Regulation is the pragmatic result of a complex 
compromise, in which legal and political constraints came to a 
partial solution in order to ensure the fullest respect of the limits 
set by Article 114 TFUE as legal ground and a political oversight at 
the highest level for resolution actions under specific critical 
circumstances. The SRM is built around a Single Resolution Board 
(SRB) - some sort of a ECB’s “little brother” - and the national 
resolution authorities (NRAs) established according to the 
relevant provisions of the BRRD; in addition, certain 
responsibilities are attributed to the Commission and the Council 
in the specific context of recovery procedures, with particular 
regard to those cases in which relevant public interests are at 
stake7. 
The SRM Regulation encompasses certain provisions on 
judicial 8  and non-judicial remedies which can be activated to 
                                                     
6 Article 7(3), paragraph four, last sentence, of the SRM Regulation. A relevant 
number of provisions of the SRM Regulation reproduces the BRRD: according 
to Wymeersh, e Zavvos - Kaltsouni, this technique is used to permit to a single 
resolution authority to use the regulation as the legal basis for its actions and 
for the use of the powers conferred, thus avoiding any recourse to national law 
implementing the BRRD. Wymeersh observes that, within the SRM Regulation, 
the Single Resolution Board will delegate the national resolution authorities to 
apply the resolution measures addressed to single entities and groups which 
are deemed to be significant; national resolution authorities will apply the 
internal provisions implementing the BRRD, although the provisions of the 
SRM Regulation would be intended to prevail in case of any inconsistency, 
according to the principle of primauté: see, E. Wymeersh, Banking Union; Aspects 
of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism compared, 
in 290 ECGI Law Working Paper, 3-5, (2015) See also, G.S. Zavvos,  S. Kaltsouni, 
The single resolution mechanism in the European Banking Union: Legal Foundation, 
Governance Structure and Financing, research paper available at 
http://www.istein.org/, also published in Research Handbook on Crisis 
Management in the Banking Sector (2015), 12. 
7  On the role of the Council and the Commission, and the importance of 
financial stability in the balance of recovery powers see G.S. Zavvos - S. 
Kaltsouni, cit., at 30. 
8  With regard to jurisdictional remedies, the SRM Regulation contains 
provisions referred both to EU and national remedies. With respect to remedies 
available in the EU, Article 86 establishes that Member States and the Union 
institutions, as well as any natural or legal person, may institute proceedings 
before the ECJ against decisions of the Board, in accordance with Article 263 
TFEU. In the event that the SRB has an obligation to act and fails to take a 
decision, proceedings for failure to act may be brought before the ECJ pursuant 
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contend a limited number of decisions taken for the recovery of 
entities falling in the realm of the banking union: resolution 
decisions are strictly out of the scope of such review. Quasi-
judicial remedies are of particular interest, as they are introduced 
and regulated directly by the SRM Regulation itself; in particular, 
the later provides for the establishment of a review body internal 
to the SRB, i.e. the Appeal Panel. Upon request by any natural or 
legal person, including NRAs, this Panel will be entitled to review 
a closed number of decisions taken by the SRB as far as addressed 
to that person or of direct and individual concern to the latter. 
Similarly to the founding rules of the ABoR described 
above, the SRM Regulation establishes certain minimum 
requirements and independence safeguards for the Appeal Panel 
and its members. First of all, it is stated that the Appeal Panel 
must have sufficient resources and expertise to provide expert 
legal advice on the legality of the exercise of powers conferred to 
the SRB: note that the wording of the clause is slightly different 
from the one used for the ABoR in the SSM Regulation, as the 
latter refers to the capacity of the ABoR to assess “the exercise of the 
powers of the ECB” under Regulation No. 1024/2013. 
Secondly, the SRM Regulation establishes that members of 
the Appeal Panel and two alternates will be appointed by the SRB 
for a term of five years, which may be extended once, following a 
public call for expressions of interest published in the Official 
Journal of the EU; similarly to their colleagues of the ABoR, the 
members of the Panel will not be bound by any instructions. The 
five members will be selected according to criteria which resemble 
those applied to the ABoR: indeed, these will be individuals with 
high repute from the Member States and with a proven record of 
relevant knowledge and professional experience, including 
resolution experience, to a sufficiently high level in the fields of 
banking or other financial services; current staff of the Board, as 
well as current staff of NRAs or other national or Union 
institutions involved in performing the tasks conferred on the SRB 
                                                                                                                                  
to Article 265 TFEU. The SRB will have to take the necessary measures to 
comply with the judgment of the ECJ. With regard to national judicial remedies, 
the SRM Regulation establishes that, according to national laws, the courts of 
Member States will have to i) verify the legality of any decisions adopted by 
NRAs pursuant to a provision of the SRM Regulation, and ii) establish the 
liability in tort of NRAs. 
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by the SRM Regulation will be automatically excluded from the 
selection. 
Article 85(3) of the SRM Regulation enlists the exhaustive 
categories of decisions adopted by the SRB which can be subject to 
the review of the Appeal Panel. First of all, the Panel will review 
any decisions which declare the inadequacy of measures to 
address or remove substantive impediments to resolvability of an 
institution, and instructing the NRAs to require the institution, 
group, parent undertaking or subsidiary concerned to take the 
measures listed in Article 10(11) of the SRM Regulation. Secondly, 
the Appeal Panel can be asked to review those decisions which 
permit or deny the possibility to apply simplified obligations in 
relation to the drafting of resolution plans or wave the obligation 
of drafting such plans, pursuant to Article 11 of the SRM 
Regulation. Thirdly, it will review those decisions which establish 
the minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities 
which significant entities and groups are obliged to fulfill at any 
time, according to Article 12(1) of the SRM Regulation, as well as 
those decisions which apply penalties and fines according to 
articles 38-41 of the SRM Regulation. Finally, the Appeal Panel 
will be in charge of reviewing certain decisions of the SRB which 
appear to be of residual relevance, including those concerning the 
determination of fees due by the entities to contribute to the SRB’s 
administrative expenses pursuant to Article 65(3) of the SRM 
Regulation, the deferral of extraordinary ex post contributions due 
under Article 71, and the decisions on the access to documents 
held by the SRB, pursuant to Article 90(3) of the SRM Regulation 
and Regulation (EC) No. 1049/20019. 
The concerned natural or legal person must file the appeal 
in writing together with a statement of grounds within six weeks 
of the date of notification of the decision, or, in the absence of such 
notification, of the date on which the decision came to its 
knowledge. The Appeal Panel will have to decide by simple 
majority on the referred matter at the latest within one month after 
lodging of the appeal. Decisions taken by the Appeal Panel are 
binding for the SRB, and they can be appealed before the 
                                                     
9 Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council, 
of May 30, 2001, regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and 
Commission documents. 
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European Court of Justice (ECJ) under Article 263 TFUE: such 
rulings may either confirm the decision taken by the SRB or remit 
the case to the latter. Pursuant to Article 85(8), the SRB shall adopt 
an amended decision following a referral by the Appeal Panel: 
even though this provision does not clarify whether the Appeal 
Panel should propose amendments to the decision, it can be 
argued that these will be derived from the reasoning which must 
be mandatory provided in its statement by the Appeal Panel itself, 
pursuant to Article 85(9) of the SRM Regulation. 
According to Article 85(6), the submission of an appeal 
does not automatically suspend the decision contended; 
nevertheless, the Appeal Panel may grant such suspensory effect if 
it is satisfied that circumstances so require. The phrasing of such 
provision is rather vague and ambiguous, as it is not clear whether 
the circumstances it refers encompass only the risks which may 
arise from the straight application of the decision before the 
Appeal Panel completes its review, or a preliminary assessment of 
the grounds of the review. 
 
 
4. Some earlier examples … 
The European legal framework provides various examples 
of appeal bodies which have similar characteristics to the panels 
described above. 
When considering the financial sector, the closest example 
is represented by the Joint Board of Appeal of the three ESAs, which 
is established pursuant to articles 58 to 60 of their respective 
founding regulations. This body is composed of six members 
appointed by the three authorities; they should have professional 
and expertise requirements which are rather similar to those 
imposed to the members of the two review bodies of the SSM and 
the SRM. The Joint Board must take its decisions by simple 
majority, although at least one member of such majority must had 
been appointed by the ESA whose decision is subject to review. 
Since its institution around five years ago, the Joint Board issued a 
total of four decisions to date. In its rulings, the Joint Board 
provided very few details and limited guidance on the role which 
it is called to play in the architecture of European supervision, and 
on its nature and functions; in addition, the ECJ still did not have 
the opportunity to pronounce on such important issues, as no case 
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examined by the Joint Board was submitted to the Court. 
Therefore, it is still unclear whether the Joint Board can exercise a 
full extent review on the matters referred to its attention, or it only 
has a limited role which involves a mere legality check10. 
In Global Private Rating Company “Standard Rating” Ltd v. 
ESMA (11), the Joint Board adopted a pragmatic approach in 
respect of the type of question concerned, i.e., the denial of 
registration of a credit rating agency by the ESMA. Before 
analyzing the case submitted to its attention, the Joint Board 
clarified that it would have verified the respect of both substantial 
and procedural provisions which regulates the credit rating 
market in Europe (12). Nevertheless, it should be noted that such a 
far-reaching scope of review could be justified in the light of the 
peculiarities of credit rating agencies’ regulation in Europe, i.e., the 
concentration of the procedure for their recognition and 
registration in the hands of the ESMA, according to a model which 
anticipated the developments of the banking union13. 
In SV Capital OU v. EBA, the Joint Board affirmed that it 
was not in the position to call in question the discretional power of 
the EBA to prompt an investigative action pursuant to Article 17 
of the EBA Regulation, on the ground that such profile had not 
been raised by the applicant14. It remains unclear whether such 
statement implies that, in the future, the Joint Board may 
intervene to assess the correct exercise of discretionary power by 
                                                     
10 In the literature available, van Cleynenbreugel, underlined that Article 60 
does not clarify “whether the Board merely conducts a legality review or whether it 
enjoys unlimited jurisdiction”. See, P. van Cleynenbreugel, Market Supervision in 
the European Union: Integrated Administration in Constitutional Context, 157 (2014). 
11 BoA 2013-014. 
12 See paragraph 44 of the decision where it is stated as follows: “The Board notes 
that under Article 18(1) of CRAR, where the respondent refuses to register the credit 
rating agency, it shall provide full reasons for its decision. Having regard to European 
jurisprudence, the Board considers the approach on the appeal should be as follows. 
With respect to the grounds raised by the appellant, the Board has to consider whether 
the respondent correctly applied the applicable Regulations and the other applicable 
instruments, whether the respondent was entitled to reach the refusal decisions, or was 
wrong to refuse registration, and whether the decision was vitiated by procedural 
irregularity or unfairness”. 
13 For such a perspective see the contribution by M. Perassi, Verso una vigilanza 
europea. La supervisione sulle agenzie di rating, in Analisi Giuridica dell’Economia, 
407 (2012).  
14 BoA 2014-C1-02. 
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any of the three ESAs, thus analyzing it according to limits and 
criteria to be defined15. 
The European legal order offers other examples of quasi-
judicial review mechanisms, which do not pertain to the financial 
sector; some examples, such as the twenty-eight Technical boards of 
appeal, the Legal Board of Appeal, the Enlarged Board of Appeal and 
the Disciplinary Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office (EPO) 
are actually outside the Union, having been established by 
international treaties signed by a large number of European 
countries. Certain EU review bodies were established in the 
context of the creation of European agencies which perform 
certain specific functions in a number of industrial sectors: these 
include the Board of Appeal of the European Chemical Agency (16), 
and the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM) 
Boards of Appeal. 
In recent years, both the ECJ and the appeal bodies 
mentioned above had the opportunity to clarify their legal status 
and the limits of their scope of review, thus outlining a European 
model of quasi-judicial review. According to such model defined 
in the European jurisprudence, these bodies tend to be attracted 
by the functions and structures of the agencies and 
administrations they relate with: in other words, they do not have 
the characteristics of independent “judges”, in so that they are 
branches of the administration called to second-guess the technical 
aspects of the decisions adopted “at first instance”. 
In Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. v. EPO (T-276/99), one 
of the Technical Boards of Appeal of the EPO affirmed that it is 
neither a tribunal not a judicial body, in so that it is not entitled to 
submit questions for a preliminary ruling under article 267 TFEU. 
                                                     
15 According to some commentators, the doubts on the role of the Joint Board 
and the extension of its review power should be resolved in the sense that such 
scrutiny should be extensive and intrude the merit of decisions taken by the 
ESAs. This opinion is argued on the basis that the decisions of the Joint Board 
can be submitted for review before the ECJ. See, E. Wymeersch, The European 
Financial Supervisory Authorities or ESAs, E. Wymeersch, Klaus J. Hopt, in G. 
Ferrarini (a cura di), Financial Regulation and Supervision: a post-crisis analysis, 
(2012).  
16 On the role of the European Chemical Agency and the remedies available in the 
field of the regulation of chemical industries and products see M. Bronckers, Y. 
van Gerven, Legal Remedies Under the EC's New Chemical Legislation REACH: 
Testing a New Model of European Governance, in Com. Mkt. L. Rev., 1823 (2009). 
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Nevertheless, in ETA S.A. Fabriques d’Ebauches v. Piranha Marketing 
GmbH and Junghans Uhren GmbH (G 0001/97), the Enlarged Board of 
Appeal stated that it can enjoy the status of a judicial body, as it 
presents characteristics which are close to those of courts; in 
particular, such status should be recognized as its members i) are 
not bound by instructions by other subjects, entities and 
institutions, ii) are obliged to solely respect the provisions of the 
European Patent Convention, iii) are appointed for a fixed period 
of time and can be removed only for cause, iv) are granted by 
provisions which ensure their impartiality, and v) take motivated 
decisions according to rules of procedure which are established by 
the panel itself. 
In the EU, the ECJ confronted with similar issues in a 
number of cases. In Procter & Gamble v OHIM17, the Court affirmed 
that the Board of Appeal of the OHMI cannot be considered as a 
court or tribunal, but as an internal body of the OHMI itself. In 
this famous ruling, the ECJ observed that the review bodies of the 
OHMI are composed of members whose independence is ensured 
by the appointment criteria and procedure, the length of their 
mandate and the concrete modalities according to which they 
exercise their functions; nevertheless, these panels are part of the 
administration which is in charge for the registration of 
Community trademarks. According to the Court, which also 
recalled a previous ruling by the Court of First Instance in Procter 
& Gamble v OHIM (Baby-Dry) (T-163/98) - a functional continuity 
exists among the OHUM and its internal appeal bodies, as the 
review boards enjoy the same powers in determining an appeal as 
the examiner: in this respect, the Court noted that while the 
Boards of Appeal enjoy a wide degree of independence in carrying 
out their duties, they “constitute a department of the Office responsible 
for controlling, under the conditions and within the limits laid down in 
Regulation No 40/94, the activities of the other departments of the 
administration to which they belong”. Therefore, a request for review 
before the Boards is intended as part of the administrative 
registration procedure. 
The principle of the “continuity in terms of functions” 
expressed by the ECJ dictates specific consequences with respect 
of the burden and content of proofs and the safeguards for private 
                                                     
17 T-63/01. 
ITALIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW, VOL. 7  ISSUE 2/2015 
 383
individuals addressing the review bodies: for example, in 
Henkel/UAMI – LHS (UK) (Kleencare)18, the Court of First Instance 
affirmed that “the extent of the examination which the Board of Appeal 
must conduct is not, in principle, determined by the grounds relied on by 
the party who has brought the appeal”, in so that, “even if the party who 
has brought the appeal has not raised a specific ground of appeal, the 
Board of Appeal is none the less bound to examine whether or not, in the 
light of all the relevant matters of fact and of law, a new decision with the 
same operative part as the decision under appeal may be lawfully adopted 
at the time of the appeal ruling”. Accordingly, in Kaul GmbH v OHIM, 
the ECJ reinstated that the continuity in terms of functions does 
not mean that “a party which, before the department hearing the 
application at first instance, did not produce certain matters of fact or of 
law within the time-limits laid down before that department would not be 
entitled, under Article 74(2) of Regulation No 40/94, to rely on those 
matters before the Board of Appeal”, as such party “is entitled to rely on 
those matters before the Board of Appeal, subject to compliance with 
Article 74(2) of that regulation before the Board”19. 
The principle developed by the Court is intended to apply 
also to the review conducted by the review body of the European 
Chemicals Agency (ECHA). In N.V. Elektriciteits – 
Produktiemaatschappij Zuid-Nederland EPZ Borssele The Netherlands v 
ECHA, the ECJ recalled the statement expressed in the Baby-Dry 
case. In this regard, the Court considered that, according to the 
very same wording of the founding provisions of the two review 
bodies, the doctrine of the “continuity in terms of functions” 
should also be referred to the board of the ECHA, with all the 
descending corollaries in terms of discretion, decisional power 
and use of evidences and grounds. 
 
 
5. … and a new banking union problematic model? 
The identification of the effective boundaries of the power 
of intervention which should be attributed to the ABoR and the 
Appeal Panel is problematic. Certain peculiarities of their 
respective legal frameworks suggest that the doctrine of the 
“continuity in terms of functions” developed throughout years by 
                                                     
18 T-308/01. 
19 ECJ, Kaul GmbH v Office for the Harmonization of the Internal Market, C-29/05, 
paragraph 29. 
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the jurisprudence may not appropriately fit in the cases at stake. 
Therefore, it is important to verify whether the European 
legislator opted for implementing a model which departs from the 
traditional review bodies with technical expertise, adapting the 
former to the distinctive nature of the matters concerned and the 
sensitivity of the issues at stake. Some preliminary remarks are 
identified hereafter. 
The first interesting profile concerns the positioning of the 
provisions which establish the two review bodies in the context of 
the SSM and the SRM regulations. Indeed, it must be noted that 
while Article 25 on the ABoR is inserted in Part IV of Regulation 
No. 1024/2013, which is dedicated to the organizational principles 
of the SSM, article 85 on the Appeal Panel is in Title VI of the SRM 
Regulation, which contains the “Other Provisions”, and shortly 
before the provisions on the recourse to the ECJ and the 
contractual responsibility and liability in tort of the SRB. The 
different placing of the two provisions might suggest that these 
bodies would play a different role in their respective framework: 
in particular, the first one would suggest that the ABoR is 
intended as a body assimilated in the structure of the ECB, and 
integrated in the system of principles and guarantees which 
safeguard the adoption of supervisory decisions in compliance 
with the rule of law; the second one may suggest that the Appeal 
Panel has a more independent attitude, allocated outside the 
administrative structure of the SRB and equipped with powers 
and independence benefits which would approximate it to an 
impartial judicial body. 
The second element to be considered concerns the 
procedure for the appointment and renewal of the members of the 
ABoR and the Appeal Panel, provided that this aspect has been 
frequently stressed by the ECJ in its jurisprudence on review 
bodies. The members of the ABoR and of the Appeal Panel are 
respectively appointed by the ECB and the SRB, following a public 
procedure based on a public call for expressions of interest and 
according to professional and expertise requirements which 
mirror the prerequisites imposed for their colleagues in other 
appeal bodies. The professional skills required, as well as the 
absence of any involvement with the supervisory and resolution 
authorities both at national and European level, certainly 
represent a guarantee of independence and autonomy of the 
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members as individuals and the body as a whole; these criteria 
support the capacity of the review bodies to withstand external 
pressures and to cope with the issues submitted on the basis of 
adequate expertise and experience, similarly to the other panels 
described above. Remarkably, the appointment and renewal 
procedures by the ECB and the SRB emulate the provisions 
adopted for other review bodies, despite potentially being able to 
reduce the effective margins for independence due to the direct 
participation and power of choice by the controlled institutions. 
A third element to be taken into account concerns the 
powers, procedure and means to be used for the review of the 
decisions according to the requests of individuals. Similarly to the 
Joint Board of Appeal of the three ESAs, the model of the panels 
considered herein still needs to be defined, although certain hints 
arise through the compared analysis of the respective relevant 
provisions. 
Firstly, the internal procedures and powers are partially 
heteronomous and partially autonomous: in particular, while the 
rules on the functioning of the ABoR are established by a decision 
of the ECB, the Appeal Panel adopts and publishes its own 
internal rules, formally without the assistance of the SRB 20 . 
Nevertheless, in this respect, a discrepancy emerges when 
analyzing the founding provisions of the two bodies: indeed, 
while in the context of the SSM the power conferred to the ECB to 
establish the ABoR descends both from the general power of the 
central bank to set its internal rules and from the specific power to 
establish the ABoR’s internal rules according to the SSM 
Regulation, in the SRM Regulation it is not clear what would be 
the scope of the provision of article 85 which empowers the SRB to 
establish the Appeal Panel. Article 50(1)p) of the SRM Regulation 
attributes to the plenary session the power to take any decision on 
the establishment and reform of the internal bodies of the SRB, as 
appropriate: it appears questionable whether this reference could 
be extended to the establishment of the Appeal Panel, and 
whether the SRB would have any power to modify the 
characteristics and rules of functioning of such panel provided 
                                                     
20  The internal rules and procedures can be retrieved at the following 
address: 
http://srb.europa.eu/sites/srbsite/files/2016rules_of_procedure_of_srb_appe
alpanel.pdf.  
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that the latter establishes its own internal rules; equally, the 
acknowledgment of such an extended autonomy may hinder the 
application of the principles of the “continuity in terms of 
functions” elaborated in the jurisprudence of the ECJ. 
Secondly, it should be underlined the uncertainty of the 
perimeter of review remitted to both the ABoR and the Appeal 
Panel, and the absence of a unitary model for reference. 
In particular, with regard to the ABoR, Article 10 of its 
founding decision reinstates that the review of the board will 
focus on the substantial and procedural compliance of the 
contended decision with the relevant rules and principles of the 
SSM Regulation; furthermore, Article 10 establishes that such 
analysis will be limited to the grounds mentioned by the 
concerned person in its claim, according to the principle on the 
correspondence between the ruling and the application. This 
specification contradicts the jurisprudence of the ECJ in the 
Kleencare case: as shown above, technical review bodies should 
take into account not only the grounds and material facts 
indicated by the appellants, but also all those elements considered 
by the deciding body in the course of the procedure which 
brought to the enactment of the contended decision. With regard 
to the Appeal Panel, no clear indication can be derived from 
Article 85 of the SRM Regulation: in particular, the second 
paragraph of such provision generically refers to the provision of 
legal advice on the legality of the SRB’s exercise of its powers. This 
rather vague diction seems to comprehend both procedural and 
substantial aspects, in so that the scope of intervention of the 
Appeal Panel would extend to the fullest extent possible within 
the limits of the Meroni doctrine. Some concerns may derive from 
the reference to the “legal advice”: this wording appears to 
suggest that the Appeal Panel does not issue a decision, but rather 
an opinion which nevertheless remains binding for the SRB. 
In this respect, the binding effect adopted for the two 
systems is innovative, and it shows the highest level of 
inconsistency both among them and in comparison with the other 
models previously mentioned. Indeed, it has been observed that 
while the decisions of the ABoR are not binding for the 
Supervisory Board and the Governing Council of the ECB and will 
be categorized as mere opinions, the decisions of the Appeal Panel 
of the SRB will bind the latter and would eventually also be 
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anticipated by suspensory measures. Therefore, and despite the 
use of the term “legal advice” noted shortly above, it appears once 
again that the Appeal Panel enjoys the highest degree of 
discretion, and it will be effectively in the position to intrude in 
the evaluations of the decisions of the SRB brought on its desk. 
As already pointed out, the power to order the suspension 
of decisions is allocated in a different manner in the two systems 
under review: indeed, while in the context of the SSM these 
powers can only be exercised by the body with a “strong” 
decisional capacity, i.e., the Governing Council, the Appeal Panel 
enjoys such power also with a presumably higher level of 
discretion - in the light of the generic reference to the 
circumstances of the case which might justify such a suspension. 
The contradiction is only apparent: indeed, it should be recalled 
that the SRM Appeal Panel does not enjoy the power to review 
any decision taken by the SRB, the NRAs, the Commission or the 
Council in the context of recovery and resolution of entities, but 
only a limited set of measures, thus benefitting of a very limited 
competence in comparison with the ABoR. As a consequence, the 
risk to confer extensive suspensory powers to a third independent 
body which would be in the position to temporary block recovery 
and resolution decisions is comparatively reduced in respect of the 
potential effect of the suspension of a supervisory decision in the 
context of the SSM. 
Finally, it is interesting to highlight the different range of 
individuals entitled to access the two review bodies. In particular, 
while access to the ABoR is granted to any natural or legal person 
concerned by the contended supervisory decision, recourse to the 
Appeal Panel is also open to claims by NRAs, which might object 
to the decisions of the SRB addressed to them. This peculiarity 
descends from the features of the SRM, under which the powers of 
NRAs are exercised according to instructions provided by the SRB 
as the single coordination point for the procedures of recovery and 
resolution. In this respect, the role of the Appeal Panel will be 
particularly sensitive: this body might indeed be called to settle 
disputes between SRB and NRAs, thus potentially reinforcing its 
impartiality and independence from the SRB. 
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6. Conclusions 
The analysis carried out in this paper shows that the 
European legislator opted for a quasi-judicial system of remedies 
in the banking union which partially diverges from the model 
established in other highly regulated technical sectors. Due to its 
features, this system cannot be reconciled in a single unitary 
model; indeed, both the ABoR and the Appeal Panel present a 
number of hybrid characteristics which place them at cross-roads 
between the principle of “continuity in terms of functions” and a 
strong connotation as judicial and independent specialized panels. 
In the SSM, the extended scope of review of the ABoR and the 
evaluation of the sole grounds submitted by the claimant, 
understood as judiciary-type features, are counterbalanced by its 
nature as internal body of the ECB, the absence of suspensory 
powers and the non-binding value of its decisions; within the 
SRM, the Appeal Panel enjoys a higher degree of independence 
and the power to suspend the contended decisions and issue 
binding opinions, although its powers of review are limited to a 
minimum number of matters due to the relevance of interests at 
stake. 
In the following years, it will be certainly interesting to 
assess the concrete functioning of such bodies, and to understand 
whether these will be in the position to critically approach the 
issues submitted to their attention. In respect of the ABoR, it 
would be interesting to note whether it will provide any public 
information on the approach and principles it intends to apply in 
analyzing the cases deferred, provided that its decisions cannot be 
published. Also, the current development of hearings and 
submission of evidence will have to be assessed, considering that 
these do not properly represent rights of claimants but rather mere 
instruments which could be used by the ABoR itself when 
satisfied that these would help in the decision of the case21. 
Finally, it is important to underline that the limits to the 
                                                     
21 Articles 14 and 15 refer to hearing and evidence before the ABoR. These 
provisions do not create a right to be heard or to provide evidences: indeed, the 
ABoR may call for an oral hearing where it “considers this necessary for the fair 
evaluation of the review”; with regard to evidences, the applicant must request 
permission to adduce, in the form of a written statement, witness or expert 
evidence, which will be admitted by the ABoR when considered necessary “for 
the just determination of the review”. 
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possibility to reexamine the decisions taken in the context of the 
SRM, combined with the restrictions of jurisdictional intervention 
on the resolution measures taken on the basis of the BRRD, may 
currently pose a serious threat to the compatibility of the system 
of judicial remedies with the principles of due process, as well as 
the right to a fair trial and practical and effective remedies as 
established and interpreted by the courts. Nevertheless, in the 
light of the experience of the Joint Board of Appeal of the three 
ESAs, and the limited recourse to its prerogative, one may 
maliciously question whether these bodies were actually 
necessary, and whether the extensive procedural guarantees 
available at each procedural stages of both pillars of the banking 
union weren’t sufficient to ensure an appropriate and fruitful 
dialogue among individuals and authorities. 
